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Russia has spent over a decade trying to recapture the influence the Soviet 
Union once enjoyed in the Middle East, but President Vladimir Putin’s attempts 
to position Moscow as a key regional player have come up short. With revolu-
tions across the Arab world overturning old orders and ushering in Islamist 
governments, Russia’s chances for strengthening its position in the region look 
increasingly slim. The Kremlin must change course and ensure that its approach 
to the Middle East and Islamists reflects post–Arab Spring realities. 
Key Themes
• Under Putin, attempts to shore up Russian influence in the Middle East 
are motivated by nostalgia for Soviet influence, a desire to demonstrate 
to Russia’s Muslim population that the Islamic world’s affairs matter to 
the Kremlin, and strategic national interests, including having a military 
presence in the region.
• Putin’s strategy has involved emphasizing Russia’s special position as a 
power that can act as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world. 
• Moscow has tried to act as mediator in a number of conflicts, including 
failed attempts to prevent the U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam 
Hussein and the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Both 
leaders were Kremlin allies. 
• Many in Moscow see mediating a solution to the Syrian crisis as crucial to 
the Kremlin’s regional strategy. But Russia’s support of Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad has been met with international criticism and has eroded 
Moscow’s position.
• The changes in leadership ushered in by the Arab Spring have damaged 
Moscow’s few remaining political and economic ties to the Middle East. 
• The rise of Islamism has resonated with the Russian Muslim population 
and encouraged the development of radical Islamist opposition move-
ments within this community.
2 | Russia and the Arab Spring 
A New Russian Approach
Define a contemporary Middle East strategy. An effective Russian policy 
would reflect current realities and a pragmatic understanding of national inter-
ests. Moscow should carve out Russia’s place in the new regional dynamic 
rather than attempt to preserve what it inherited from the Soviet Union.
Deepen cooperation with Arab countries based on shared interests. 
Moscow could help establish a regional security system that can preserve sta-
bility in the Middle East and stop the spread of Islamist upheaval before it 
destabilizes Russia and its neighbors.
Develop a more sophisticated approach to Islamism. The Kremlin would 
benefit from reaching out to newly elected Islamist governments in the Arab 
world and addressing the growing influence of Islamists in Russia.
 
3Introduction
Since Vladimir Putin was first elected president in 2000, Russia has pursued a 
foreign policy designed to recapture the influence that the Soviet Union once 
enjoyed in the Middle East. These efforts, however, have been unsuccessful, 
and the Russian Federation has never reclaimed the vestiges of Soviet power 
in the region. Now, the Arab Spring has brought to a close the era of Soviet-
Arab relations. 
The Arab revolutions have drastically changed the situation not just in the 
Middle East but also globally. The world’s leading powers are directly or indi-
rectly being drawn into the developments unfolding in the region. The revo-
lutions have helped fuel contradictions between Russia and the West, which 
took opposing stands in the Libyan conflict and even 
more so in the Syrian conflict. The Arab Spring has also 
given Islamism a seal of legitimacy as a permanent factor 
in politics in the Muslim world, a development that has 
ramifications for Russia’s domestic stability. As Russian 
Middle East analyst Georgy Mirsky said, the “Arab world 
is radical political Islam’s testing ground.”1 
The changes in the Middle East in general are forcing 
the Kremlin to reflect on Russia’s prospects in the Arab 
world and on how to go about building relations with the 
new elites coming to power in several Arab states. Moscow now has to con-
centrate not on trying to preserve what it inherited from the Soviet Union but 
on developing a new strategy and tactics to define Russia’s place in the post–
Arab Spring Middle East. 
Russia’s Historical Ties to the Middle East 
Russia’s relationship to the Arab world has gone through several distinct 
phases. Pre-Soviet Russia, or the Russian Empire, did not have any major aims 
and ambitions in the Arab Middle East, save for protecting the Orthodox 
Church’s interests in Palestine. Its strategy focused instead on other regions—
the Mediterranean Straits, Persia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. The 
Middle East itself lay at the periphery of the Russian Empire’s interests, all the 
more so as the region was dominated by Turkey and the European powers. 
There was no fundamental change in this situation after the 1917 revolution 
that overthrew Russia’s czarist regime and established the Soviet state. The 
Middle East held little strategic interest for the ruling Bolsheviks, who decided 
Moscow now has to concentrate not on 
trying to preserve what it inherited from 
the Soviet Union but on developing a new 
strategy and tactics to define Russia’s place 
in the post–Arab Spring Middle East. 
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that the Arab countries did not have great revolutionary potential. Marxist 
circles and parties set up in the Arab world with Moscow’s help had little 
influence, and local liberation movements did not depend on the Bolsheviks. 
The situation began to change after World War II, when, flush with vic-
tory, the Soviet Union’s global ambitions grew and seemed entirely realistic to 
Soviet leaders. The substance of Soviet policy in the Middle East and the Arab 
world was the fight against the West, and Moscow’s approach to the region fit 
into the paradigm of confrontation between the two systems that character-
ized the Cold War era. The Soviet Union sought alliances with those Middle 
Eastern countries whose political orientations were closer to the Soviet sys-
tem, so its main allies in the Middle East were Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya.
These partnerships gave Moscow political advantages in its confrontation 
with the West, but the Kremlin harbored hopes for the ideological as well as 
political rapprochement of these Middle Eastern countries with the Soviet 
Union. Kremlin ideologues sought to plant the Soviet version of social, eco-
nomic, and political development in the Arab world, and Moscow did its best 
to facilitate this work. Governments in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, 
and Libya did indeed at various moments show interest in the Soviet model, 
and some of them spoke favorably about Marxism. In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, Soviet scholarship developed the concepts of “socialist orientation” 
and the “noncapitalist development model,” which were supposed to explain 
the reasons why Arab countries and others were drawing on the Soviet model 
and make it look like an attractive path for the Third World.  
Many of these socialist-oriented countries became military-political launch 
pads for the Soviet Union in its confrontation with the West. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict remained the epicenter of Middle East tension, and here the Cold War 
turned into actual military action, at times with the direct involvement of the 
Western countries and the Soviet Union. Such was the case in 1956, when the 
British and French took Israel’s side in its conflict with Egypt. Soviet military 
personnel—pilots, air defense crews, even tankers—after 1967 took part on 
Egypt’s and Syria’s side in a number of clashes with Israeli forces, though this 
was never officially recognized by Soviet officials. In Libya during a military 
parade in 1979, tanks were driven by Soviet sergeants. 
The benefits of political and ideological rapprochement with Middle 
Eastern countries outweighed the fact that economic benefits from coopera-
tion with Arab “clients” were minimal for the Soviet Union. Indeed, Arab 
countries built up billions in debt to Moscow that post-Soviet Russia eventu-
ally ended up having to forgive. 
For their part, Arab governments stood to gain significantly from coop-
eration with Moscow. The Soviet Union carried out ambitious projects in 
these countries, such as constructing the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Nag-
Hammadi Steelworks in Algeria; supplied them with cheap and quite effective 
weapons; and gave them unconditional support in their wars against Israel. 
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The Soviet Union offered the only counterweight to Western pressure to 
accept Israel’s existence, and the Arabs thought that in extreme circumstances 
Moscow could take extreme measures, even military ones, to support its Arab 
allies. But that was an illusion. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made it clear 
that the Soviet Union was not willing to resort to direct military confrontation. 
This was the heyday of Soviet influence in the Middle East, but it did not 
last long. Arab disappointment in cooperation with the Soviet Union set 
in during the 1970s. Soviet military and political support failed to turn the 
Middle East conflict in the Arabs’ favor, and in financial and economic coop-
eration the Soviet Union could not compete with economically and techno-
logically more developed Western countries. The Soviet Union suffered from 
an internal economic crisis that made it harder to expand support for its Arab 
allies. Some Middle Eastern countries expressed dissatisfaction with Soviet 
military supplies. Local media, especially in Egypt, complained that Moscow 
was supplying the country with defensive weapons when offensive arms were 
needed. When Soviet Jews started emigrating to Israel, people in the Middle 
East noted wryly that the United States was supplying Israel with weapons and 
the Soviet Union was giving it soldiers. 
In 1972, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers 
and specialists from his country. This was the beginning of the end for the 
Arab-Soviet friendship. At the same time, together with the United States and 
Israel, Sadat initiated the Camp David peace process, in which Moscow was 
given no role. 
With the start of perestroika in 1985, the Arab world gradually shifted to the 
periphery of Soviet foreign policy. Post-Soviet Russia had neither the means 
nor the strength to maintain its former level of relations with Arab countries. 
Soviet diplomacy in the region underwent a reexamination, a symbol of which 
was the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1991. The Arab gov-
ernments, for their part, were disappointed in Russia as an economic partner 
and political ally. According to a survey of Moroccan college students, Arab 
citizens did not recognize Russia as a strong successor to the Soviet Union—
whereas 96 percent of respondents viewed the Soviet Union as a great military 
power, only 52 percent considered Russia a great power. As Soviet influence 
faded, Russia was left with only a tenuous foothold in the Middle East.
Putin’s Russia: Seeking the Soviet Legacy 
During the 1990s, Russia did not even attempt to define its national interests 
in the Middle East and the Arab world. It was not until after Vladimir Putin 
came to power at the turn of the century that Moscow started pursuing a more 
active policy in the region. 
Putin’s attempts to shore up Russian influence in the Middle East were 
motivated by a combination of nostalgia for the legacy of Soviet influence and 
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strategic national interests. In part, Moscow’s policy in the 
region reflected its continuing “superpower” complex and 
the desire to be equal to—or at least comparable to and able 
to oppose—the West and, above all, the United States. But 
it also reflected Russia’s general loss of great-power status, 
waning global influence, and shrinking sphere of national 
interests, even if Moscow formulated these interests in 
overly ambitious and often populist terms. 
Origins of Putin’s Policy
Unlike postimperial Britain, which managed to carve out a new place for itself 
in the world relatively quickly, post-Soviet Russia’s loss of global status was 
a painful process. Giving up its imperial claims lightened Britain’s load and 
gave it an international profile that more accurately reflected the country’s real 
economic and political weight in the world. By contrast, after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Russia went through a prolonged bout of “Sovietism” in 
which it attempted to recapture its Soviet heritage. 
To this day, the Kremlin sometimes gives the impression of having not 
yet realized the fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and the 
Russian Federation and the impossibility of reversing history. This mentality 
contributes to Russia’s desire to demonstrate at least some kind of military and 
political presence in the Middle East. Moscow hopes to hold on to the vestiges 
of the former Soviet base in the Syrian port of Tartus, for example, which is 
the sole remaining Russian military base in the region.
Putin’s Middle East policy is also motivated, at least in part, by military-
technical cooperation, which—despite falling volumes—earns money for 
Russia’s defense industry and is seen as a means of “binding” the Arabs to 
Russia. Beyond this limited revenue stream, however, actual economic ties 
between Russia and the Middle East have little importance for both sides. This 
is especially true for the energy producers. Russia and the Persian Gulf coun-
tries, Iraq, and Algeria are direct and indirect competitors in the fight for mar-
kets. Attempts to organize cooperation in this area, such as Moscow’s efforts 
in 2009 to establish a gas-producing countries’ version of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, ended in failure.
Islam and Moscow’s Middle East Policy
Russia has another reason for attempting to establish an active presence in 
the Middle East—the Kremlin wants to show Russia’s own Muslim citizens 
that it is willing to cooperate with their fellow Muslims abroad. Russia has 
a significant Muslim population, especially in the North Caucasus and the 
Volga Region, and Moscow is anxious to demonstrate that it is involved in the 
Islamic world’s affairs and ready to defend Muslims’ interests if need be. 
Putin’s attempts to shore up Russian influence 
in the Middle East were motivated by a 
combination of nostalgia for the legacy of Soviet 
influence and strategic national interests. 
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The Kremlin does not have a clearly defined historical position with regard 
to Islam or to working with Islamist regimes. Russian politicians have repeat-
edly declared their willingness to work with whichever government a people 
elects, reflecting a pragmatic position. Moscow is engaged in dialogue with 
Iran’s leadership and has tried to build relations with the Hamas Islamic resis-
tance movement. After Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections in 
2006, Russia even offered its services to help settle the differences between the 
movement and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. 
Russia has also been trying to develop tolerable relations with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, which has played a prominent role in the country since 
the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak. 
Moscow’s attitude toward Islamists depends on the positions they take on 
issues of importance to Russia. The Kremlin shows respect for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, but considers its Syrian counterpart—
which is currently participating in a civil war to oust Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad, a Russian ally—a terrorist organization. Moscow also clashed with 
the Islamists in Libya who took part in overthrowing Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi, another Kremlin ally, in 2011. In addition, Moscow categorically 
opposes Islamist extremists linked to al-Qaeda, which has contributed to vio-
lent insurgencies in Russia’s restive North Caucasus region. 
Islamists and the architects of Russia’s state ideology share one common fea-
ture: an identity built on a base of anti-Western sentiment. Islamists and the 
Russian Orthodox Church both stress that they each have their own under-
standing of democracy and human rights that is different 
from the Western interpretation. Islamist radicals, espe-
cially the Salafis, reject the principles of democracy and can 
be compared to Orthodox fundamentalists, who call for a 
return to an idealized communal spirit and want to revive 
“Orthodox Russia” as a state matrix. Here, there are unex-
pected similarities to the idea of an Islamic state. 
But these similarities are unlikely to ever result in Russia and the Islamists 
joining forces. Indeed, Russia rejects the Salafis, many of whom constitute 
a leading force of Islamic opposition in the Caucasus. But mutual respect 
and understanding between them are perfectly possible. A number of books 
devoted to the idea of a merger between Russia and the Muslim world and 
Russia’s Islamization have already been published in Russia.
The Faults in Moscow’s Middle East Policy
Putin’s strategy for pursuing a more influential role in the Middle East has 
involved emphasizing Russia’s special position as a distinct civilizational entity 
that combines West and East and reminding the Arab world that Russia’s pop-
ulation includes around 20 million Muslims.2 The goal of this foreign policy 
is to present the country as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world. 
Islamists and the architects of Russia’s state 
ideology share one common feature: an identity 
built on a base of anti-Western sentiment. 
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But Putin’s attempts have failed to increase the Kremlin’s influence in the 
region. Moscow tried to play the part of mediator between the West and Iran, 
between the Arabs and Israel, and between the United States and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq before Washington launched military operations against 
Baghdad in 2003, but these efforts did not produce political dividends of 
any real significance. The Muslim world did not accept Russia as one of its 
own, and the West had no need for Russian mediation in its relations with 
the Muslims. Putin’s meetings with Arab heads of state and government in 
2005–2007 also failed to produce the desired results.  He was unable to con-
clude a number of proposed economic contracts, including an agreement with 
Saudi Arabia on a joint railway-construction project (although Russia signed 
a similar contract with Libya in 2008). Putin’s proposal to create a regional 
security system was also rejected by Arab governments.3  
The faults of Putin’s policy—and the weakness of Russia’s position in the 
region—became especially clear when Moscow proved unable to prevent the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Kremlin spoke out repeatedly against a U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, and well-known Russian politicians such as Liberal Democratic Party 
leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov 
publicly expressed their support for Saddam Hussein, all to no avail. Moscow 
was incapable of playing the role of counterweight to the United States. 
Failing to stop the U.S. invasion also cost Russia one of its last footholds 
in the region. Saddam Hussein was one of the few remaining “friends” who 
hoped to see in Russia the Soviet Union’s successor in the Middle East. After 
his departure from the political stage, Russia’s only remaining partners of any 
importance in the region were Syria’s Assad and Libya’s Qaddafi.  
Over the next few years, Russia’s influence in the Middle East continued 
to fade. Polling numbers from Egypt indicate that the number of respondents 
with a positive view of Russia fell from 50 percent in 2007 to 30 percent in 
2012. Respect for Russia dropped in Libya and Tunisia. In Jordan, only 25 per-
cent of respondents had a positive view of Russia, and in Turkey the figure was 
16 percent. Only in Syria did Russia continue to get a fairly high assessment, 
with 50–55 percent viewing it positively.4  The Kremlin’s influence decreased 
further with the outbreak of antigovernment uprisings in 2011 that came to be 
known as the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring
With the start of the Arab Spring, Russia’s influence in the Middle East waned 
even further and its chances for strengthening its position in the region looked 
increasingly slim. The Kremlin at first interpreted the Arab Spring’s events as 
the result of planned Western intervention specifically designed to decrease 
Moscow’s hold on the region. Many in Russia saw in the protests an echo of 
the “color revolutions” against the governments in former Soviet countries 
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that were believed to have been encouraged by Western powers. One Russian 
expert wrote that all the Arab revolutions “are very similar to the scenar-
ios of the color revolutions.” Following this logic, he asked: “Who is really 
ordering and carrying out these revolutions?”5 Countless Russian publications 
explained the Arab Spring in terms of conspiracy theories and the idea of 
a Western plot to further its own selfish interests—in particular, squeezing 
Russia out of the Middle East. 
Eventually, Moscow moved away from the understanding of the events in 
the Middle East as a Western-orchestrated challenge to its place in the region. 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in early 2013, describes the revolts 
as evidence that Arabs “desire to return to their civilizational roots” and says 
that “political and social-economic renewal of society is often taking place 
under the slogan of affirming Islamic values.”6 But shifting the narrative sur-
rounding the unrest did little to change the fact that the Arab Spring further 
reduced Moscow’s already-tenuous position in the Middle East.
According to Putin, Russia’s economic and political relations with coun-
tries in the Middle East have been negatively affected. He said that “in the 
countries that have gone through . . . [the Arab Spring,] Russian companies 
are losing the positions they built up over the decades on local markets. . . . 
Economic actors from the same countries that lent a hand to changing the 
ruling regimes are now stepping in to fill the niches that have been freed up.”7 
Political cooperation with many post–Arab Spring regimes is symbolic and 
limited to the statements issued after official visits. For example, political rela-
tions with Tunisia, which “never were a priority,”8 have not improved with 
the ascension of the country’s new Islamist government. Ties are limited to 
diplomatic niceties. 
Russia has also struggled in its political relations with postrevolutionary 
Egypt. In November 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that 
Moscow was ready to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood, which had 
come to power in Egypt. He delivered to Mohamed Morsi, winner of the 
Egyptian presidential election, Putin’s invitation to visit Moscow. At the same 
time, a 2003 Russian Supreme Court ruling declaring the Muslim Brotherhood 
a terrorist organization and a threat to Russia’s security remained in force. 
Analysts have long been proposing that the Muslim Brotherhood be removed 
from the list of terrorist organizations, fearing that keeping it there will result 
in Russia “losing its relations with the entire Arab post-revolutionary world.” 
They argue that supporting the new Islamist elites now may help Moscow in 
the long term.9 
As this issue remains unresolved, Russia and Egypt have no political con-
tacts of any significance. Neither Moscow nor Cairo shows any real desire to 
expand them, especially because there is no pressing economic reason to do so 
(Egypt’s trade with Russia represented just 0.3–0.4 percent of its total foreign 
trade in 2008).10 
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Since Morsi was forced to step down in July 2013, Russia’s relations with 
Egypt look even more uncertain. It seems a fairly safe bet that relatively more 
pro-Western politicians will come to power after the new parliamentary and 
presidential elections. This is a concern in other Middle Eastern countries as 
well; if the Islamists fail to keep hold of power in Tunisia and perhaps else-
where, they might end up replaced by pro-Western elites. These forces are 
alien to Russia, and Russia is alien to them.
No matter who becomes the next president of Egypt, he will try to maintain 
strong ties with the Persian Gulf monarchies, which give 
Cairo financial aid worth several billion dollars and with 
which Moscow does not enjoy particularly close relations. 
In this situation, the Russian vector in Egypt’s policy will 
inevitably be increasingly limited. 
Indeed, Russia’s post–Arab Spring relations with nearly 
every Middle Eastern regime are either unchanged or worse. 
Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been practically 
nonexistent since the Soviet period, when the two countries 
had virtually no contact. Neither country has made any serious effort to improve 
the situation, which suggests that neither side is particularly interested. Russia’s 
relations with the other Gulf countries—including Bahrain, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Qatar—remain low-key overall. Media reports that mem-
bers of Bahrain’s Shia opposition had visited Moscow did nothing to improve 
Russia’s relations with these largely Sunni Gulf countries, most of which support 
the Bahraini government against this opposition. 
Relations with some of the Arab nations that have been spared revolu-
tionary upheaval—Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan, for example—remain 
unchanged. Russia does not have particularly strong relations with Morocco 
or Jordan, although it does enjoy some economic and political ties to Algeria 
that have not been significantly damaged by the regional upheaval. 
 The only exception to this rule of stagnant or deteriorating relationships 
is Yemen. Russia’s relations with Yemen look to be doing quite well in the 
wake of the Arab Spring. Popular protests overthrew Yemeni President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, who stepped down in February 2012. But Yemen’s regime 
change model suits Moscow, which likes the fact that the protests ousting 
Saleh did not take place under the banner of the fight for democracy and 
appreciates that the events bore no resemblance to any of the color revolutions. 
Unlike in Libya, the Yemenis got by without outside help and avoided 
humanitarian intervention. When they did reach out to foreign powers, 
they included Russia in the conversation—Yemen’s ambassador to Russia, 
Mohammed Saleh al-Hilali, suggested that then Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev could send a special envoy to Yemen to persuade the opposing 
parties to resolve the conflict through peaceful means.11 Ultimately, however, 
Moscow took no part in the country’s peace process, leaving it instead to the 
If the Islamists fail to keep hold of power in 
Tunisia and perhaps elsewhere, they might end 
up replaced by pro-Western elites. These forces 
are alien to Russia, and Russia is alien to them.
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United States and Saudi Arabia. The Kremlin perhaps took the view that it 
was risky to intervene in Yemen’s affairs because the situation there was so 
complicated and extremists had a lot of influence; as one Russian newspaper 
put it, “it would be easy to get involved in Yemen, but the consequences would 
be serious.”12
Moscow did not take such a hands-off approach in other Arab countries. In 
those nations where Russia has become directly involved in the Arab Spring—
Libya and Syria—the effects have been particularly problematic.
Direct Russian Involvement
During the Arab Spring, Russia has again attempted to act as mediator, both 
between antagonistic sides within the Arab countries as well as between out-
side actors—Americans and Europeans—and the regimes besieged by oppo-
sition forces in Libya and Syria.
Libya
As popular protests swept Libya in 2011, Moscow found itself caught between 
the desire to keep Qaddafi, a Russian ally, in power and Western pressure 
to allow international support to the rebels. The Kremlin tried to prevent 
European intervention in the Libyan internal conflict, blocking a number of 
United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions that would have permit-
ted intervention by using its veto. Eventually, however, Moscow gave in to 
growing international pressure to support the forces opposing Qaddafi. On 
February 26, 2011, Russia joined the embargo on arms exports to Libya, and 
it abstained in a March 2011 UN Security Council vote that imposed a no-fly 
zone over Libya, giving other countries the right to take necessary measures 
to protect the civilian population. This allowed the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to carry out a military operation at the end of March. 
In June 2011, Moscow attempted to persuade Qaddafi to step down, but 
it was already too late. Qaddafi’s opponents no longer needed any compro-
mise or voluntary resignation on the part of the Libyan leader. With U.S. and 
European backing, they pushed onward to victory through the force of arms. 
Having lost to the West in the diplomatic intrigues over Libya, Russia was 
only the 73rd country to officially recognize the authority of the opposition 
National Transition Council, which had gained the upper hand in the fight 
against Qaddafi. Such belated recognition of the new government inevitably 
affected Moscow’s relations with Libya. 
The new Libyan regime quickly started showing signs that it was not happy 
with the Kremlin. In 2012, the Tripoli Military Tribunal sentenced Russian 
citizen Alexander Shadrov to life imprisonment for “abetting” Muammar 
Qaddafi.  There is no longer any force in Libya that looks to Russia for sup-
port, and there is no sense of gratitude toward Moscow for forgiving Libya’s 
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$4.5 billion debt to Russia in April 2008. The view in Tripoli is that this act 
of debt forgiveness was directed not at Libya itself but at Qaddafi specifically. 
The new Libyan government did not honor the $10 billion worth of contracts 
that Russia had concluded with Qaddafi and instead declared that these agree-
ments would undergo a revision. Tatneft and Gazprom, two major Russian 
energy companies, ended up having to abandon their Libyan contracts. Alexei 
Kokin, an analyst from the leading Russian financial corporation Uralsib, said 
that “Russia has been left empty-handed; the Libyan oil market is going to 
Italy’s [multinational oil and gas company] ENI.”13 American and European 
companies have also stepped in to take the Russian companies’ place. 
Syria
With Qaddafi gone and the new Libyan government displeased with the 
Kremlin, Moscow has only one remaining friend in the Middle East—Syria’s 
Assad. Many in Moscow see Syria as a chance—perhaps a final chance—for 
Russia to reclaim the influence of its Soviet past. But the Kremlin’s policy of 
supporting Assad has earned it international criticism and further eroded its 
influence in the Arab world.
Russia wants to prevent Assad’s fall for a number of reasons, including 
geopolitical and economic ones. Russian gas exports, for example, are one 
consideration. So long as Syria remains unstable, neither Qatar nor Iran can 
pursue plans they have in the works to build gas pipelines through Syria, giv-
ing Russia extra time to develop its own gas projects, Nord Stream and South 
Stream. Some experts contend that “it is entirely possible that these consider-
ations could explain why Moscow’s assistance for its last remaining ally in the 
Middle East is limited to taking a categorical line in the UN Security Council 
and preventing the West from beginning legal intervention.”14 But that is only 
part of the story. As Carnegie’s Dmitri Trenin has noted, “in a deeper analysis, 
Russia’s stance on Syria is based, above all, on its leader’s largely traditional 
view of the global order.”15 Keeping Assad in power is Moscow’s way of ensur-
ing that it maintains some influence in the Middle East. 
Russia’s desire to maintain an image of a global power can be seen in its 
attempts to restore its military presence in the Mediterranean, which the 
Defense Ministry plans to do by 2015. Moscow has an interest in maintaining 
a military base in the region, and Tartus in Syria is rumored to be the preferred 
site. The move is likely to be more symbolic than functional. According to 
military expert Oleg Shvedkov, Moscow would be capable of sending a maxi-
mum of ten ships and two or three submarines.16 This force is not designed 
for military confrontation with a serious adversary. Its main task is political; it 
is there to demonstrate Russia’s presence in the region. 
These considerations have led Moscow to throw its support behind the rul-
ing Syrian regime. Early in the conflict, this stance was not entirely unpopular, 
even in the West, as Assad seemed to be ready to engage in dialogue. Many in 
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the United States shared the view that Assad was potentially willing and able 
to carry out reforms and even partially liberalize the regime. In March 2011, 
when the level of tension in Syria was still comparatively low, U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton said that “Bashar Assad is a reformer” and gave this 
as the reason why “the United States has no interest in intervening in Syria.”17 
But with the start of civil war in Syria, the United States and Europe became 
disappointed in Assad. He rejected dialogue and tried to rely on military force 
to settle the conflict, and his regional alliance with Iran made any dialogue 
between Damascus and outside actors extremely difficult. As the conflict 
began to have effects on Syria’s neighbors—Lebanon and Turkey—it took on 
an increasingly regional dimension. 
Effects of Russia’s Syria Policy
As the situation deteriorated, Russia tried to assume the role of mediator, 
attempting to maintain its influence in the Middle East and the Arab world by 
insisting on the importance of its mediation efforts in settling the Syrian crisis. 
It offered to mediate in both the internal confrontation and the international 
intrigue surrounding Syria. To this end, it hosted the first Russian-Arab Forum 
in February 2013, during which Moscow and the Arab League held talks on 
the situation in Syria. Those invited to the forum included then Egyptian 
foreign minister Mohamed Amr; Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari; and 
members of the Arab League Council from Kuwait, Lebanon, and Libya. 
Secretary General of the Arab League Nabil al-Arabi said that Russia and the 
Arab League seek peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict and expressed the 
hope that Moscow “will be able to convince the Syrian government on this.”18 
In September 2013, Russia began an effort to broker a deal in which Assad 
would surrender his regime’s chemical weapons stockpile. Russia proposed 
the deal after U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Washington was 
considering launching a military strike against the Assad regime, which had 
reportedly used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. This effort was an 
attempt by Moscow to accomplish what it failed to do in Libya—prevent the 
armed intervention of Western actors in the conflict and keep the regime of 
its ally intact. 
Syrian opposition forces and their allies abroad have perceived Russia’s 
continued mediation as support for Assad’s regime. Russia’s position on Syria 
has made its relations with the Arab world even cooler. The Arab Middle East 
is firmly allied against the ruling Syrian regime. When the Arab League voted 
in 2012 to expel Damascus from its ranks, only Algeria and Syria itself voted 
against the decision, and Arab leaders vocally criticized Russia’s support of 
the Syrian regime. When then prime minister of Qatar Hamad bin Jassim bin 
Jaber al-Thani added his voice to the criticism, Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s envoy 
to the UN, retorted, “If you speak to me in that kind of tone again, the place 
we call Qatar won’t be on the map any longer tomorrow.”19
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The Arab world sees the Syrian conflict as not only a purely internal Syrian 
affair but also a confrontation between outside actors, above all the United 
States and its allies versus Russia and China. Dean of the Faculty of Economic 
and Business Administration at the Lebanese University Camille H. Habib 
said that “the struggle for Syria is a struggle for Eurasia with different charac-
ters.”20 Syria, following this logic, is where global confrontations meet. 
This understanding also indicates that the Arab world still has an interest, 
albeit not widely publicized, in retaining in the Middle East a Russian pres-
ence to partially balance the West’s activeness. This leaves Russia the chance 
to position itself as a restraining force standing in the way of foreign military 
intervention. It is also clear that Russia does not itself want to become directly 
involved in any military conflicts. “There are no indications currently that the 
Russians are sending troops to help the regime’s armed forces. There are also 
no signs that the Americans and concerned Europeans would get involved in 
Syria in a similar way to their involvement in Libya.”21 
The Islamic community has joined Western and Arab actors in criticizing 
Russia’s support for Assad. One of the Muslim world’s most prominent theo-
logians, Yusef al-Qaradawi, said Russia “has become enemy No. 1 for Islam 
and Muslims because it supports the Syrian regime.” He also declared that 
“the Arab and Muslim world must rise up against Russia. We should boycott 
Russia and count it amongst our main enemies.”22 The fourth conference of 
the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, held in Marrakech in December 
2012, ended with the 70 member countries voting to recognize the National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, an umbrella group 
for organizations opposed to Assad, as the sole legal representative of Syria’s 
people. This development undermined the chances that Russia, which still 
recognized the legitimacy of the Syrian president, could successfully act as a 
mediator in the conflict.  
The conflict in Syria—and Russia’s role in it—is further complicated by 
sectarian concerns. As Sergei Lavrov said in March 2012, “Syria could become 
the start of very serious events. . . . Unfortunately, it is here that the growing 
crisis within the Islamic world between Sunnis and Shiites could burst into 
the open.”23 Analysts noted the possibility of this turn of events right from 
the start of the Syrian crisis. French analyst Hosham Dawod predicted in 2011 
the possible emergence of two “hostile crescents”; the first made up of Shia 
in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and the second composed of radical Sunnis from 
Egypt, Syria, and Palestine.24 In reality, both crescents reach far wider and not 
only include radicals but also extend to the mostly moderate Muslims in the 
Arab countries. 
Western actors, who see the increased Iranian influence that would accom-
pany a triumphant Shia crescent as a threat, “back the Sunni side” by support-
ing the Syrian opposition.25 Russia, by contrast, does not seek to play the card 
of Shia-Sunni differences. Its position is complicated by the fact that it shows 
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solidarity with Iran on the Syrian question, but on issues such as the Iranian 
nuclear program, it stands with the Arab countries—that is to say, it takes the 
side of Iran’s opponents. 
Moscow is tied to Tehran not only by the closeness in their policies on the 
Syrian issue but also by the perception of interference by a common Western 
enemy. As one scholar notes, “People in both Tehran and Moscow interpret 
the protest movements through the light of conspiracy theories and see the 
West’s hand in them.”26 The solidarity in their views has led some Western 
media to talk of a new “axis of evil” comprising Russia, Iran, and Assad’s 
Syria. This was the expression used, for example, by Fox News commentator 
Kathleen McFarland.27 The result of this Western criticism has been to further 
isolate Russia on the Syrian issue. 
Assad, who does not always listen to Russia’s advice, has also created big 
problems for Moscow. His reluctance to make concessions to the opposition 
has put the Kremlin in a difficult position. Russian diplomats have made 
numerous declarations that Assad is willing to soften his stance, only to have 
him fail to keep his word. In October 2012, for example, Assad declared his 
willingness to accept a ceasefire for the duration of the Eid al-Adha holiday 
but then refused to honor the agreement. Meanwhile, Western countries and 
their allies in the Persian Gulf continued supplying arms to the opposition. 
Now, Moscow has grown tired of Assad and the way he has been compro-
mising Russia’s peacemaking efforts. Seeing that the Syrian president has been 
unable to suppress the opposition, some Russian officials have come to believe 
that Assad will not hold on to power much longer and should perhaps be mak-
ing arrangements for a transition.28 Russia has cut back its military assistance 
to Assad as a sign of its disappointment in his regime and its fears of ending 
up completely isolated. Anatoly Isaykin, the head of Russian arms exporter 
Rosoboronexport, said that “there is no question of delivering fighter planes 
and helicopters, including repaired ones, to Syria. . . . Rosoboronexport has a 
contract to deliver Yak-130 training fighter planes, but not a single aircraft has 
been delivered yet.”29
Moscow’s latest mediation effort indicates that it still sees an opportunity to 
contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis. So far, however, Russia’s 
support for Assad has cast it as an enemy of virtually all other Arab nations. 
More broadly, it has made Moscow the enemy of many Sunni Muslims, drawn 
Russia further into an uneasy alliance with Iran, and pitted against the West.    
The Radicalization of Russian Islam
The Arab Spring has undoubtedly caused problems for Russia’s foreign policy. 
But the revolutions in the Middle East may also have consequences far closer 
to home. In their early interpretations, neither Moscow nor the Western capitals 
foresaw the religious dimension to the Arab revolutions. For Russia, this aspect 
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may prove crucially important on the domestic front.  The triumph of Islamism 
in the Arab Spring has resonated with the Russian Muslim population and 
encouraged the development of opposition movements within this community. 
When the Arab Spring began, Moscow was concerned it would energize 
Russia’s political opposition. The Arab revolts occurred around the same time as 
demonstrations by Russian opposition forces protesting an allegedly fraudulent 
legislative election. Recognizing that the Arab demonstra-
tions opposed (and toppled) authoritarian regimes that had 
similar features to the current political system in Russia, 
leaders in Moscow were nervous about the effect the Arab 
Spring might have on the Russian protests. In February 
2011, then president Medvedev said that revolution in the 
Arab countries would have a “direct impact” on the situ-
ation in Russia.30 Shortly thereafter, then prime minister 
Putin said, “We are very concerned, despite palliative state-
ments that it is unlikely that radical extremist groups can come to power in 
North Africa or become considerably stronger.”31 
But despite similarities in structure and strategy—both the Middle Eastern 
and Russian opposition forces made broad use of social networks, for exam-
ple—the Arab opposition was considerably stronger than its Russian coun-
terpart. Protests in Russia were sporadic and could not compare in numbers 
and scale to the Arab protests. The Kremlin swiftly recovered from the initial 
shock and found means to suppress discontent and manipulate public opinion. 
Fears generated by the Arab Spring and worries that Moscow had made the 
same mistakes as the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to 
some extent spurred the Kremlin into a new flurry of political public relations 
and manipulation. While the Arab Spring heated up the Middle East, Russia 
felt the cold breath of a new “Russian winter.” 
Moscow may have prevented the Russian political opposition from rep-
licating the revolutions in Egypt or Tunisia, but it could not keep the Arab 
Spring from resonating with Russians—and especially with Russian Muslims. 
The victories of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamist Ennahda 
Party in Tunisia, as well as the participation of Islamists in Libya’s new gov-
ernment and their growing activeness in general, gave some Russian Muslims 
the impression that these new Islamist elites could become Russia’s allies. 
The “Islamic lobby,” made up of politicians of Muslim origin who think that 
Russia has a new opportunity to bolster its position in the Middle East and 
the Muslim world in general, has become more active in Russia, especially 
in Moscow and the North Caucasus. These hopes were well put by Shamil 
Sultanov, a former State Duma deputy and head of the Center for Strategic 
Studies Russia–the Islamic World, who said that “Russia has a launching pad 
that . . . [Islamist governments] could use effectively to score points. If we are 
The triumph of Islamism in the Arab Spring 
has resonated with the Russian Muslim 
population and encouraged the development of 
opposition movements among this community. 
Alexey Malashenko | 17
talking about friendship, the [Muslim] Brotherhood is more likely to make 
friends with Russia than with the USA.”32 
The success of Islamists abroad, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, also 
raises the question of attitudes toward the Islamic opposition within Russia 
itself. This is especially important for authorities in the North Caucasus 
republics who are battling against the Brotherhood’s Russian followers and 
watching while the Kremlin attempts to strengthen its ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Cairo. 
Unrest in the North Caucasus
Solidarity with fellow Muslims in the Arab countries has become the leitmotiv 
of slogans at demonstrations organized by Islamists in the North Caucasus, 
historically a hotbed of violence and separatist activity. Protesters called for 
the overthrow of Russia’s government in the city of Kazan in August 2012. 
The participants, including quite a few supporters of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami 
Islamist movement, which operates in the North Caucasus, sent letters to UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary General of the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu in which they wrote of the 
“bloody political regime in Russia and Tatarstan.” The Islamists held a collec-
tive prayer of support for their “brothers” killed by “Assad’s bloody regime.” 
In February 2013, in Dagestan’s capital, Makhachkala, two Islamic orga-
nizations held a demonstration to show solidarity with Assad’s opponents 
in which around 700 people took part. Magomed Kartashov, head of the 
Union of the Just, one of the organizing groups, asserted on behalf of Russian 
Muslims that this was a protest against Russia’s policy in Syria. According to 
Kartashov, the Syrian opposition is seeking “the law of Allah.”33 In his view, 
this is in keeping with Islam’s ideals. Similar protests have occurred in other 
parts of Dagestan.
In an attempt to hold back the rising tide of radicalism, the Russian authori-
ties, together with domestic Muslim clergy loyal to the Kremlin, have tried a 
number of different tactics. For example, they came up with the initiative to 
hold international conferences with the participation of prominent theolo-
gians from the Muslim world. The first in this series of conferences took place 
in Moscow in 2012. Among those invited to take part was Yusef al-Qaradawi, 
the chairman of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, an organization 
of Islamic theologians, who had been critical of Russia’s Syria policy. 
In the same year, the authorities in Dagestan, together with the repub-
lic’s Spiritual Administration of Muslims, held a theological conference in 
Makhachkala to which they invited the secretary general of the union, Ali 
Muhiddin al-Qaradaghi, hoping he could help encourage dialogue with the 
local Islamic opposition. During this kind of dialogue, the authorities and the 
Muslim clergy close to them often attempt to get their opponents to admit 
their own mistakes and abandon their convictions. Al-Qaradaghi, however, 
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called for equal dialogue and did not support the official policy of suppressing 
the religious opposition. He advised Moscow to “appeal to the Islamists to 
reach agreement with the secularists on the nation’s enduring principels and 
then let each work in their own way, but . . . keep to the general course of serv-
ing the people.”34 Al-Qaradaghi also noted that the Dagestani Salafis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have common goals and that they differ only 
in the methods for reaching them.35
Al-Qaradaghi’s visit had mixed results for the local authorities in Dagestan. 
The conference adopted a fatwa that condemned extremism and called for 
moderation. At the same time, al-Qaradaghi affirmed the common nature 
underlying events in the Muslim world, of which Russia’s Muslims are a part, 
and also the influence of Arab Islam on them. 
The initiative to have foreign theologians take part in international con-
ferences of this kind did not go any further. It did nothing to help boost 
Russia’s international influence and did not dampen Islamic radicalism inside 
the country. 
The Volga Region
The increase in extremism was not limited to the Caucasus. The previously rel-
atively peaceful Volga Region, above all the Republic of Tatarstan, also saw an 
upsurge in Islamist activity. Terrorists seriously injured one prominent mufti, 
Ildus Faizov, in a car bomb attack in July 2012 and killed Valiulla Yakupov, 
traditional Islam’s main ideologue in the region, on the same day. The attacks 
resembled others perpetrated by extremists in the Caucasus, and the media 
even began to talk of the Volga Region’s “Caucasization.” 
Internal disputes within Tatarstan’s Muslim community were clearly at the 
heart of these attacks, but the background of general increased Islamist activ-
ity cannot be ignored. Indeed, some analysts think that “events in Tatarstan 
today look very much like the scenario for ‘Arab revolutions’ of the kind that 
took place in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.”36 Radicals and Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami 
supporters organized several opposition meetings that brought hundreds of 
Muslims, mostly young people, into the street. In August 2012, they organized 
celebrations of a Muslim holiday in Kazan’s Victory Park and demanded that 
Russian flags be removed and replaced with Hizb ut-Tahrir symbols. Radically 
minded Muslim groups are operating in several towns in Tatarstan, particu-
larly in Naberezhnye Chelny and Nizhnekamsk.
Radicals have also become more active in the neighboring Republic of 
Bashkortostan, where several Islamist groups already existed. Kuk Bure 
(“Gray Wolves”), an Islamic nationalist organization that emerged during the 
time of former Bashkortostan president Murtaza Rakhimov (who stepped 
down in 2010), operates underground. Islam is becoming more radical in the 
Southern Urals and Siberia too.37
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In its attempts to stem the rising extremism, government officials have 
tried appealing directly to the leaders of various Russian Muslim organiza-
tions. The authorities in Tatarstan, trying to offset the damage caused by local 
radicals’ demonstrations, gave the head of the republic’s 126-person-strong 
Syrian community, Ahmad Hamam, the chance to speak out. He gave his sup-
port to Assad and said that if the opposition wins in Syria, the country will 
follow the same fate as Libya.38
The Influence of Central Asia
As radicalism increases in the North Caucasus and the Volga Region, Russia’s 
southern borders are becoming ever more porous for Islamists from Central 
Asia. Migration of Muslims from this region—estimated at 700,000 to 2 mil-
lion Uzbeks,39 800,000 to 2 million Tajiks, and 400,000 to 800,000 Kyrgyz—is 
leading to a rapid increase in the Muslim population in Russia. This Islamist 
penetration is especially notable in regions bordering or close to the Central 
Asian region—the Astrakhan, Kurgan, Omsk, Orenburg, Tomsk, Tyumen, 
and Chelyabinsk regions and Bashkortostan. The migrants include Hizb ut-
Tahrir Islami members, who form small cells of three to five people into which 
they then try to draw local Muslims. According to Alexei Starostin, a scholar 
specializing in Islamic studies, “a sizeable number of Salafist associations and 
groups set up by the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and other extremist organiza-
tions are active in the Urals Federal District.”40 They are promoting the idea of 
creating a caliphate and disseminating pamphlets and other literature.
In Central Asia itself, the Arab Spring has not noticeably increased radical 
or antigovernment sentiment. This is partly because of the hardline nature of 
the region’s authoritarian regimes. It may also be attributed to the local peo-
ple’s passivity, their lack of traditions and skills in political struggle, and the 
long isolation from the outside world that Central Asians went through during 
the Soviet decades. But the region’s sense of removal from events elsewhere 
in the world is wearing thinner. As analyst and head of the Muslim Spiritual 
Board of the Nijegorodskaya Oblast Damir Muhetdinov put it, “the events 
in the Middle East cannot fail to have an impact on the situation in Central 
Asia, where the ruling regimes are attempting to maintain stability. . . . If we 
let other forces enter the region, how can we protect ourselves against the 
kind of scenarios now unfolding in the Arab world, and which do not make us 
optimistic?”41 James M. Dorsey of the S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies in Singapore writes, “with countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
ranked among the world’s worst violators of basic freedoms, the region is feel-
ing the impact of the revolts in the Arab world. . . . The experience of Turkey 
shows that giving Islamists space has produced what many see as a model for 
the Middle East and North Africa and perhaps for Central Asia too.”42 
In other words, it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility that Central 
Asia could become the grounds of a struggle between moderate and radical 
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Islamists. This sort of a struggle would likely spill over 
into the North Caucasus, where radicals may well gain the 
upper hand in a number of regions.43 In this context, one 
of the main reasons why Russia supports Assad’s regime, 
in the view of Arab analyst Saad Mahyu, is the “threat of a 
Sunni fundamentalist movement headed by Saudi Arabia 
and looking particularly to expand into Central Asia.”44
Effects on Russian Muslims
The official line in Moscow is that the Arab Spring—and perhaps also those 
Western powers that have helped advance it—has stirred up dissent among 
Russia’s own Muslim community. Farid Salman, head of the Council of Ulemas 
of the Russian Federation, which is loyal to the authorities, said that the “Arab 
revolutions are having a negative influence on Russia’s Islamic community.” 
In keeping with the official ideology, he said he considers religious Muslim 
dissidence something stirred up by “Russia’s geopolitical adversaries and by 
agents of influence at work in the Muslim community under various masks.”45 
According to some accounts, Middle Eastern Islamists are also providing 
tangible support to their coreligionists in Russia; the president of the Religion 
and Society Information and Analysis Center, Alexey Grishin, who previ-
ously worked in the Russian presidential administration, wrote that “religious 
extremists in Russia have not only financial support from their victorious fel-
lows in the Middle East, but also political support through international diplo-
macy.” Islamists in Arab countries also guarantee Russian radicals political 
asylum if they are persecuted. According to Grishin, “the Islamist radicals’ 
ultimate aim is to turn the Muslims into the Russian opposition force.”46 
Despite their influence on Russian Muslims, it is unlikely that these outside 
actors will trigger an Arab Spring–like uprising in Russia. Establishing a reli-
gious-based opposition across the whole of Russia is unrealistic, and in any case, 
Russian Muslims are wary of Moscow not because of influence from abroad but 
because of the authorities’ systematic mistakes in the Muslim regions. 
Even so, the Arab Spring may have lasting effects on Russian Muslims. 
Reports began appearing in mid-2012 that several dozen (some reports say 
hundreds or even thousands of) Russian Muslims—Tatars, Bashkirs, and 
people from the North Caucasus—were fighting in Syria on the side of the 
opposition.47 Their involvement, like that of fighters from Syria’s neighboring 
Arab countries, cannot decide the war’s outcome, but it shows that they sup-
port and are putting into practice the idea of the kind of international Islamic 
solidarity that had already operated in Afghanistan, the North Caucasus, and 
Central Asia. An opposition victory in Syria would boost the influence and 
popularity of this idea among opposition-minded Russian Muslims. It is also 
possible that after the war in Syria ends, some of these fighters, still possessing 
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enough bellicose potential, will return to continue the struggle in the North 
Caucasus and perhaps even test their strength in other parts of Russia, includ-
ing the Volga Region. 
Crafting a Post–Arab Spring Policy
The Arab Spring marked a definitive end to the chapter of Russia’s Soviet-era 
legacy in the Middle East. For the Kremlin, which still cannot bring itself to 
admit the ineffectiveness of a world order established more than fifty years ago 
and in need of transformation, this is a disaster for which it was unprepared. 
Moscow was too long held spellbound by the Middle East’s familiar landscape 
of authoritarianism and stagnation and continued to count on Arab support 
in some instinctive hope that the friendly old regimes in Iraq, Libya, and Syria 
would stay in place forever. Russia’s clinging to the past comes through par-
ticularly strongly in the Syrian conflict. 
Now, Russia’s foreign policy needs to focus on possible further change. 
Russia’s diplomats will have to assess the shifting balance of power and make 
their conclusions based on post–Arab Spring realities. As Moscow reformu-
lates its Middle East policy, it should not focus its attention on particular polit-
ical groups or leaders (as is the case in Syria) but should instead base its policy 
on the most likely development of events in each particular country. Russia 
needs to develop an objective awareness of what it can do and what it wants 
in the Middle East—in other words, it needs to decide what its national inter-
ests are. These interests must be clearly formulated, and it would be logical to 
cleanse them of any ideological dimension. The Kremlin must be consistent in 
its declared course of pragmatism. 
Russia has lost its influence in the region but still has opportunities for 
strengthening its position there, above all through bilateral relations between 
Moscow and some Arab countries. There is still interest in 
Russia in the Arab world and the wider Muslim world. In 
particular, Russia has real a chance to take part in develop-
ing and establishing a regional security system that would 
not only help to preserve stability in the Middle East but 
would also have a positive effect on the situation in Russia’s 
neighboring countries. The Arab Spring made it all the 
more clear that any upheavals, especially if linked to active 
use of religious slogans and ideas, tend to spread geographi-
cally, crossing the borders into neighboring countries. 
It is not in Russia’s interest to put the emphasis on con-
frontation with outside actors. Joint efforts to develop a new security system in 
the Middle East could provide the foundation on which to build cooperation 
with other regional and international forces. Work on building this kind of coop-
eration should start now, including with Arab countries that do not agree with 
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Russia’s policy in Syria. The Syrian crisis makes all the more clear the need to look 
for compromises in situations that at first glance seem impossible to resolve. If 
no compromise is found, the civil war in Syria not only will lead to that country’s 
disintegration but could also trigger a new round of regional cataclysms. 
As Moscow works out the details of its new policy in the Middle East, it is 
also important for Moscow to take into account the Arab Spring’s impact on 
Russia’s Muslim community, which is only now starting to show its reaction to 
the upheavals in the Middle East. Russian Muslims are following with interest 
and even admiration the successes of their radically minded coreligionists in the 
Arab world, and many think that Russia should seek a rapprochement with the 
victors. Of course, Moscow cannot shape its foreign policy to suit the wishes 
of Muslims in the North Caucasus or the Volga Region. At the same time, the 
Kremlin must take into account the possibility of an increasingly radicalized 
Islam in Russia, especially in the context of the Russian leadership’s desire to 
maintain normal relations with the new elites in the Arab world. 
With the Arab Spring, the issue of relations and dialogue with Islamists 
has acquired increased importance for the outside world, including the West, 
Russia, China, and India. Islamists’ successes on the political scene can no 
longer be regarded as isolated episodes. Islamism—no matter how it is defined 
and which movements, parties, or groups are understood to be affiliated with 
it—will continue to be involved in politics on the national, regional, and global 
levels for several generations to come. 
23
Notes
1 Georgy Mirsky, “Krizis, nabirayushchy silu” (A Growing Crisis), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
March 13, 2013.
2 The number of  Muslims in Russia is somewhere between 17 and 20 million people. 
The lower figure covers Muslims who are Russian citizens, while the second figure 
includes migrants from Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Nobody knows the real number 
of  migrants in Russia at any one time. 
3 Alexey Malashenko, “Rossia i Musulmanski Mir” (Russia and the Muslim World), 
Carnegie Moscow Center Working Paper 3, 2008, 24.
4 Arthur Lukmanov, “Rossiyskie Musulmane i  ‘Arabskaya Vesna’” (Russia’s Muslims 
and the “Arab Spring”), Mejdunarodnaya Jizn, Russian Foreign Ministry, 2012, 86–87.  
5 A. Manoilo, “Revolyutsii na Blizhnem vostoke i v Severnoy Afrike: politicheskyi 
pragmatism i technologii upravlyayemogo khaosa” (The Revolutions in the Middle 
East and North Africa: Political Pragmatism and the Technology of  Managed 
Chaos), Mir i Politica 9 (2011): 59–69. 
6 Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, Official Site of  the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, www.mid.ru.
7 “Putin ob Arabskoi Vesne: ‘Ne mogu poniat, otkuda u stran NATO takoi 
voinstvennyi zud’” (Putin on the Arab Spring: “I Cannot Understand Why the 
NATO Countries Have Got Such a Military Itch”), nakanune.ru, February 27, 2012, 
www.nakanune.ru/news/2012/2/27/22264513.
8 “Rossia i noviye elity stran Arabskoy vesny: vozmozhnosti i perspektivy 
vzaimodeystviya” (Russia and the New Elites in the Arab Spring Countries: 
Prospects and Opportunities for Interaction), Russian Council for International 
Affairs Working Paper V, 2013.
9 Viktor Matynyuk, “Rossii pora perestat’ boyatsya Bratyev-musulman?” (Is It Time 
for Russia to Stop Being Afraid of  the Muslim Brotherhood?), KM.Ru, June 25, 
2012, www.km.ru/v-mire/2012/06/25/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya/rossii-pora-
perestat-boyatsya-bratev-musulman.
10 Eldar Kasaev, “Rossiya i Egipet” (Russia and Egypt), Open Economy, Expert Portal 
of  the Higher School of  Economics, www.opec.ru/1297965.html.
11 “Narod Yemena—za peredachu vlasti mirnym i zakonnym putyom” (Yemen’s 
People Seeks a Peaceful and Lawful Transition of  Power), interview with Yemen’s 
Ambassador to Russia Mohammed Saleh al-Hilali, Kommersant.ru, March 29, 2011. 
12 “Prezident Yemena soglasilsya peredat vlast’ premyeru” (Yemen’s President Agreed 
to Hand Power to the Prime Minister), Kommersant.ru, April 11, 2011.
13 “Al Ahram: Blizhnevostochnaya dilemma Rossii” (al Ahram: Russia’s Middle East 
Dilemma), Nash Mir, http://nashmir.kz/news/al-ahram-blizhnevostochnaya 
-dilemma-rossii.
14 Ernest Sultanov, “Eshchyo odin gaz” (One More Gas), Kommersant Vlast,   
January 28, 2013, 16. 
24 | Russia and the Arab Spring 
15 Dmitri Trenin, “From Damascus to Kabul: Any Common Ground Between Turkey 
and Russia?” Insight Turkey 15, no. 1 (2013): 43.
16 Vladimir Mukhin, “Pyataya eskadra vernyotsya v sredizemnoye morye” (The Fifth 
Squadron Will Return to the Mediterranean), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 26, 2013. 
17 Bernard Gwertzman, “Syria’s Stalled Revolution,” interview with Joshua Landis, 
director, Center for Middle East Studies, University of  Oklahoma, Council on 
Foreign Relations, March 29, 2011, www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-stalled-revolution/
p24515.
18 Artur Blinov, “Nazrelo vremya dlya dialoga v Sirii” (The Time Is Ripe for Dialogue 
on Syria), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 21, 2013.
19 Editorial, Expert, July 30–August 12, 2012, 57.
20 Camille H. Habib, “The Struggle for Syria Is a Struggle for Eurasia With Different 
Characters,” presentation at the third regional conference, “The Arab World 2013: 
Dynamics of  Change; Security, Economical and Good Governance Challenges,” 
organized by the Lebanese Armed Forces, Research and Strategic Studies Center, 
April 10–13, 2013.  
21 Abdallah bou Habib, presentation distributed at the third regional conference, 
“The Arab World 2013: Dynamics of  Change; Security, Economical and Good 
Governance Challenges.” 
22 Vladislav Maltsev, “Poslantsev Khalifata zovut v Moskvu” (The Caliphate’s Envoys 
Called to Moscow), NG-Religiya, December 5, 2012.
23 “Lavrov: v islamskom mire nazrevayet krizis” (Lavrov: A Crisis Is Brewing in the 
Muslim World), Oreanda-Economic News From Over the World, March 17, 2012.
24 Hosham Dawod, “Quand le regime syrien tombera” (When the Syrian Regime Falls), 
Le Monde, July 12, 2011.
25 Barry Rubin, “The Sunni-Shia Conflict Will Be the Major Feature of  Middle 
East Politics for Decades,” Gloria Center, November 4, 2012, www.gloria-center.
org/2012/11/the-sunni-shia-conflict-will-be-the-major-feature-of-middle-east-
politics-for-decades. 
26 Jean-Pierre Filiu, Le Nouveau Moyen-Orient: Les peuples à l’heure de la révolution syrienne 
(The New Middle East: The People at the Hour of  the Syrian Revolution) (Paris: 
Librairie Artheme Fayard, 2013), 207–208.
27 Interview, Fox News, February 22, 2012.
28 “Syria Assails NATO Over Missiles,” International Herald Tribune, December 7, 2012.
29 “Russia Supplying Arms to Syria Under Old Contracts: Lavrov,” Reuters, November 
5, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/05/us-syria-crisis-russia-arms-
idUSBRE8A40BE20121105.
30 “Dmitry Medvedev Held a Meeting of  the National Antiterrorism Committee in 
Vladikavkaz,” Official Website of  the President of  Russia, February 22, 2011, http://
kremlin.ru/news/10408.
31 “Russian Government–European Commission Meeting,” February 25, 2011, 
www.russianmission.eu/en/news/russian-government-%E2%80%93-european-
commission-meeting.
32 “O Bratyakh-musulmanakh i lape Vashingtona” (On the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Washington’s Hand), IslamRF.net, http://islamrf.net/?p=28355.
33 Vladislav Maltsev, “Islam zatchichshayut ot nelegalov” (Islam Is Being Cleansed of  
Illegal Immigrants), NG-Religiya, February 20, 2013.
34 “Sheikh Ali Muhiddin Al-Karadagi: ‘The Holy Koran Clearly Explains That Allah 
Created Mankind for Creation and Development, Not for Killing,’” RIA Dagestan, 
November 17, 2012, www.riadagestan.ru/news/2012/11/17/146313.
35 Maltsev, “The Caliphate’s Envoys Called to Moscow.” 
36 Rais Suleimanov, “‘Arabskaya revolyutsiya’ v Tatarstane: islamskiye fundamentalisty 
v regionalnoy politike” (“Arab Revolution” in Tatarstan: Islamic Fundamentalists 
in Regional Politics), Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Volga Region Center 
for Regional and Ethno-religious Studies, www.kazan-center.ru/osnovnye-
razdely/14/302.
Alexey Malashenko | 25
37 See Alexey Malashenko, “The Dynamics of  Russian Islam,” Carnegie Moscow 
Center, February 1, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/01/dynamics-of-
russian-islam/f88a.
38 “Lider siriytsev v Tatarstane: ‘Esli ne budet Assada, Siriiu zhdet sudba Livii’” (Syrian 
Community Leader in Tatarstan: “Without Assad, Syria Will End Up Following  
the Same Fate as Libya”), Regnum, www.regnum.ru/news/fd-volga/
tatarstan/1641017.html.
39 Quoted from Yelena Sadovskaya, Demoscope Weekly, Naseleniye i obschestvo (Population 
and Society), 415–16, March 22–April 4, 2010, 21.
40 Alexei Starostin, “Vliyaniye protestov i revolyutsii na uralskykh musulman” 
(Influence of  Protests and Revolution on Muslims in the Urals), Islam v SNG 3 
(2012): 37.
41 Damir Mukhetdinov, “Zharkoye leto perekhodit v spokoinuyu osen na 
prostranstvakh SNG” (Hot Summer Giving Way to Calm Autumn Over the Territory 
of  the CIS), Islam v SNG 38 (2012): 6, 8.
42 James M. Dorsey, “The Arab Revolts: Impact on Central Asia,” S. Rajaratnam School 
of  International Studies (RSIS) Commentary 161, August 27, 2012.
43 Vitaly Naumkin, “O politike Rossii na yuzhnom napravlenii” (Russia’s Policy Toward 
Its Southern Neighbors), Otsenky i Idei (Assessments and Ideas) 1, no. 1, Russian 
Academy of  Sciences’ Institute of  Oriental Studies, November 2011, 8.
44 Saad Mahyu, “Russia and the Arab Spring,” Majalla al-Mustaqbal 405 (November 
2012): 130.
45 “‘Arabskiye revolyutsii’ negativno vliyayut na islamskuyu obshchinu Rossii” (The “Arab 
Revolutions” Are Having a Negative Impact on Russia’s Islamic Community), Interfax, 
March 4, 2013, www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=interview&div=371&domain=3.
46 “Tsel’ islamistov—prevratit rossiiskikh musulman v pyatuyu kolonnu” (The Islamists’ 
Aim Is to Turn Russia’s Muslims Into a Fifth Column), Regnum, www.regnum.ru/
news/1602899.html.
47 “V Povolzhye zarodilsya khalifat” (A Caliphate Has Emerged in the Volga Region), 
December 4, 2012, www.jacta.ru/russia/article/?id=1251. 
 
Carnegie Moscow Center
Established in 1994 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
the Carnegie Moscow Center brings together senior researchers from 
across the Russian political spectrum and Carnegie’s global centers to 
provide a free and open forum for the discussion and debate of critical 
national, regional, and global issues.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global 
network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle 
East, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, 
is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh 
policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers 
in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers 
bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, 
regional, and global issues.




O C TO B E R  2 01 3
Carnegie.ru
B E I J I N G       B E I R U T       B R U S S E L S       M O S C O W       WA S H I N G TO N
